On The Brink

From Vienna to Kiev via Johannesburg.

The final destination is known but the outcome remains unclear.

Spain and Italy will meet for the second time at Euro 2012. The opening group game which ended in a 1-1 draw, was a slow, tactical affair with Prandelli surprising Spain with his use of a 3-5-2 system which provided the Italians with strength in the midfield and nullified the threat of the Spanish full backs. An in depth analysis of the opening group match can be viewed here.

And so to Sunday and again, there will be much deliberation by Prandelli and how he lines up his side.The personal may be largely known but the system to be deployed is the key question which he must address. Whatever system is chosen, the same conundrums that have vexed opposing coaches throughout this tournament need to be addressed and answered. Firstly, how to contain Spain and thereafter, how to beat Spain.

Italy

Prandelli faces one main issue ahead of this game.

Does he stick with the loose 4-4-2 system with a diamond in midfield which has aided Italian success thus far or does he return to the 3-5-2 system which created so many problems for Spain in the opening game. That he has the luxury of using either system is both his fortune and his burden ahead of this game. Win and his tactical set up was correct. Lose and his tactics failed him.

Such assertions can be wholly inaccurate but are thrown around as if gospel. The inability of those to understand that the result merely represents the final outcome and not what occurred during the game itself. Of course, a correct tactical system would be scant consolation should the result not favour you at this stage of the competition.

Neither system will prevent Spain from dominating possession. Prandelli has already acknowledged this:-

“We don’t expect to be in charge of this game.”

Instead, Prandelli must choose which system can maximise Italian potential.

Should Prandelli favour the 3-5-2, it’s likely to mean a recall for Maggio at right wing back with Balzaretti returning on the left. Balzagli, Bonucci and Chielini would form the defensive trio.

The key question which Prandelli must then answer is who would he drop from Montolivo, De Rossi and Marchisio? The three have played well throughout the tournament and De Rossi and Marchisio offer the perfect screen for Pirlo, pushing forward onto opponents midfield and leaving Pirlo deep to circulate the ball. If the midfielders cannot push further up the pitch, Pirlo has less space to operate.

If Pirlo has time, he will automatically look for the strikers with long passes as the Italians have sought to do throughout. The tactic was used repeatedly early in the game against England and achieved success in the first half against Germany.

Cassano and Balotelli will remain as the two strikers, seeking to isolate the Spanish central defensive pairing of Pique and Ramos as often as possible, pulling them into the channels and the space vacated by the full backs pushing high.

Although wing backs naturally start higher up the pitch, it’s highly unlikely that the Spanish full backs would adopt such conservative positioning again as they did in the first game. Could Maggio and Balzaretti push Albs and Arbeloa back?

The other concern with the 3-5-2 would be the role that the central defenders fulfill if Fabregas starts. Who do they mark? Fabregas will drop deep and leave three central defenders with no clear role. The solution would be to start De Rossi in the back line again and Montolivo to retain his position in midfield but this loses the aggression and robustness of De Rossi from a central area which would be required to assist with breaking up Spanish attacks.

Should Prandelli retain faith in the 4-4-2 diamond it allows the midfield trio to stay intact and push onto the Spanish. The downside though is the loss of width as the Italian full backs will be pushed back by the advancing Alba and Arbeloa. Abate could be recalled at right back if injury permits or the impressive Balzaretti may start here again. Maggio is too adventurous for a full back position and would be overlooked. Pirlo is also likely to be hindered by Fabregas dropping deep and occupying the space in which he operates. A reduction in his possession will limit his ability to influence the game.

Spain

Spain will line up with their normal 4-3-3 with the usual questions surrounding two positions; the striker and the right sided attacking berth.

And yet it seems so obvious that del Bosque will opt for Fabregas in the false 9 role to establish control. The thought of Pirlo controlling another game from deep must be anathema to the Spanish. Fabregas will, as we know by now, drop deeper than Torres and link with the midfield.

To combat the Italian numbers in midfield, Fabregas must start and drop deep to provide options. One of the successes of the Spanish game at this tournament as been the manner in which they press quickly to regain possession in a structured fashion. There will be no set instructions for someone to press Pirlo. Whoever is nearer from a fluid midfield must take responsibility and close him down. This could mean Fabregas if central or Iniesta and Silva when tucking in from the wings.

Silva continues to deliver and yet infuriate on the right wing. With one goal and three assists to his name, Silva has played a major role in Spain’s progress to date. Doubt lingers though over what he could be doing. The need for an extra touch sometimes when a simple, quicker pass would be the more profitable option. Del Bosque has removed Silva in each game thus far.

Alba and Arbeloa must advance for Spain. Italy are very narrow and whilst Spain are often accused of a similar failing, they have the ability to change and alter this via Navas and Pedro if need be. In the first instance though, the full backs must push high and stretch the narrow Italian midfield.

Andrea Pirlo

Judging by the reaction to the performance of Andrea Pirlo against England, you may be somewhat surprised to learn that Pirlo is in fact 33 years old with a long and distinguished career behind him which includes most major titles. Except that of European Champion.

The performance of Pirlo against England was often majestic as he glided around the center of the pitch with considerable ease, spraying the ball around and dictating the play. The clamour for him to be crowned player of the tournament has grown steadily aided by another performance infused with class against Germany.

If there is a player who can prevent Pirlo from collecting this individual award, he is lining up opposite Pirlo in the shirt of la furia roja, the man who calmly states that the ball is “my friend”; Andres Iniesta. The Spanish No8 remains one of the few players from la seleccion to have escaped criticism during this tournament. Possessing the ability to accept the ball under pressure and invite challenges before releasing it, Iniesta has provided Spain with a constant driving presence from the left thus far. From within the seemingly relentless passing of the Spanish midfield, Iniesta will break and surge forward and commit defenders creating space for team mates.

Although not in direct competition, the battle between the winners of the Man of the Match awards from the past two World Cup Finals, promises to be something special as they seek to shape and influence the game.

Enter the Pantheon

And so, we journey to Kiev.

A Spain win brings footballing history. Three successive international trophies, the first team to successfully defend their European Championship crown. Winning the trophy brings much more however. It cements Spain’s place in the pantheon of the greats, rightfully taking their place amongst the winners in the history of the game. The pantheon contains more than just winners however. For some teams are fondly recalled for the manner in which they played, their legacy cherished by all who were fortunate enough to glimpse these teams at their footballing peak as they defined an era irrespective of whether they won or not.

Spain will be spoken of alongside the free flowing Brazil of 1970, the total football of Cryuff and Holland in 1974 and 1978, Brazil in 1982 who remain arguably remain the greatest side never to win the World Cup, France in 1998 and 2000 guided by the genius of Zidane. And now Spain in 2008, 2010 and 2012.

This is the era of tiki-taka.

Spain are standing on the brink.

Spain vs Portugal: Tactical Analysis – Cesc’s Moment Part 2

Spain progress to their third successive major international final and join an elite club with just two members; Germany and Brazil.

Spain will now contest their fourth European Championship final, aiming to become the first team to successfully defend their title.

This was a highly interesting game, if seldom electrifying until the conclusion, which witnessed a Portuguese team determined to attack Spain and yet failing to register a single attempt on target in 120 minutes of play.

Line Up

Del Bosque made one change to the side that had defeated France in the Quarter Finals. It was not the change that many had envisaged, that being the choice between Torres and Fabregas again.

Alvaro Negredo made his first start of the tournament in the central striking role.

Spain vs Portugal – Spanish Starting Line Up

Bento had one change enforced upon him with Hugo Almeida replacing the injured Helder Postiga otherwise Bento kept faith with his normal starting eleven.

Spain vs Portugal – Portuguese Starting Line Up

Portugal Approach

Prior to the game Bento had stated his intention not to park the bus. Portugal would attack. For the first time in the tournament, we saw a team prepared to push high up against Spain and press them all over the pitch

Throughout the game, Portugal defended well and sought to push forward and create scoring opportunities. They pressed aggressively and energetically across the whole pitch, forcing Spain to play long balls which the aerial ability of Alves and Pepe could deal with easily.

Spain were clearly unsettled by this and yet for all of the effort displayed, Portugal ultimately failed to muster a single shot on target.

Why Negredo?

“Negredo suits our needs more than Soldado. He’s better aerially and he links up more with the team”

del Bosque

The inclusion of Alvaro Negredo surprised many yet in some respects it made perfect sense. Negredo can provide the compromise solution between Fernando Torres and Cesc Fabregas. He offers a range of qualities most notably his powerful physical presence allied to his finishing but his ability to drop deeper than a normal striker on occasion and link with the midfield arguably helped gain him the starting slot.

The Spanish Assistant Toni Grade noted:-

“Each forward has different characteristics. Negredo is ideal today – power, athleticism & height defending corners.”

One area where Spain have struggled so far is how to use the high number of corner kicks they win. Despite having seven corners last night, Spain inevitably lose possession if the corner is played into the penalty area. Negredo, in theory, should have helped with this.

Spain Corners vs Portugal

The potential which was highlighted never came to fruition though and Negredo departed after just 52 minutes.

Alvaro Negredo – vs Portugal

Negredo had just 22 touches of the ball before he was substituted. What many had considered to be a gamble, even though it was nothing of the sort, had failed. Negredo appeared static and often isolated and whilst he much accept a portion of the criticism for this, part of the reason must also lie with his team mates. Arbeloa has the opportunity to cross to Negredo in the opening 15 minutes but delayed and lost possession. If you select Negredo, you also need to supply him.

The final part of the reason for his lacklustre performance was the manner in which Portugal performed and in particular, their midfield trio.

Portugal Midfield

The usual midfield trio lined up in the midfield for Portuguese with Veluso the deepest of the three, Meireles seeking to link defence and attack and Moutinho providing the creative spark in a more advanced role. Yet to label the three players in such a fashion does them a great disservice. The trio showed tremendous versatility as they provided triangular rotation throughout as the situation dictated.

They were able to press Spain aided by the high defensive line being held. When Spain broke through the midfield, Pepe was very quick to step forward and close down space.

The pressing though was also apparent higher up the pitch. Moutinho stealing the ball from Alba in the 29th minute to offer Ronaldo an opportunity to shoot.

The trio broadly shadowed their Spanish opponents in central midfield with Veluso given tha task of marking Xavi. This was visible in the 19th minute when Xavi, frustrated by his limited involvement, became the deepest Spanish midfielder dropping between the centre backs to collect possession where Veluso followed him.

The result of the aggressive pressing by the Portuguese was that Spain’s pass completion rate in the first half dropped to their lowest level thus far in the competition at 85.3%. Spain ended the first half with 56% possession, again a substantial drop on their normal levels.

It was obvious how much Spain had been affected by the pressing of their opponents. Spain played 29 long balls in the first half beginning at the very outset with a long ball forward to Negredo straight from kick off. The longs balls continued in the second half when Spain played 44 long balls forward.

It should be abundantly clear why Spain play in the manner in which they do. When forced to play long balls and enter a more physical contest, the Spanish are lacking.

This tight marking and aggressive pressing by Portugal resulted in a loss of fluency in the game especially during the second half which developed into a fraught, tense affair.

Xavi Squeezed Again

Just as he had been squeezed against France, last night witnessed another performance by Xavi which is not in keeping with his normal performance level.

His starting position was once again, much higher than normal creating two key problems; he has fewer passing options ahead of him when he receives the ball and he is easier to mark by opposition players, in this instance, Miguel Veluso.

Against France, Spain coped with the performance of Xabi Alonso by as he too was pressed, te Spanish lost their fluent style and any creativity from midfield forward arrived via the driving runs of Andres Iniesta.

Portuguese Left vs Spanish Right

What was billed as being a pivotal duel in the contest never quite lived up to expectations. Much of the pre-match hype surrounded Ronaldo and his ability to cause his team mate at club level, Alvaro Arbeloa, numerous problems.

Arbeloa managed to stay high and attack early on rendering the conventional viewpoint that he would remain defensive, redundant. He linked well with David Silva whilst Ronaldo took up slightly more central positions.

As the second half progressed, Almeida looked to drift across to the left into the space vacated by Arbeloa. This resulted in Almeida having two clear shots on goal but on both occasions, his shooting was wayward.

Ronaldo Shots vs Spain

Billed as the weak link in the Spanish defence, Arbeloa proved defensively solid throughout. Indeed, both he and Pique combined successfully to nullify the threat from Ronaldo. All of Pique’s tackles coming in the right back area as he offered cover to Arbeloa.

Arbeloa did have an element of fortune in his performance through. He committed 8 fouls, the most by any player at Euro 2012 so far, yet his inevitable yellow card arrived due to a handball and not one of the more cynical fouls he committed higher up the pitch.

Arbeloa and Pique – Tackles

Extra Time

As with their other games to date, Spain gradually took control of the game as their opponents tired. The introduction of both Pedro and Navas on the wings helped stretch a tiring defence wider apart and offered the necessary space for Iniesta to have an increasing influence as the game progressed.

Jordi Alba also provided ample evidence of why Barcelona have just signed him with a number of surgng runs forward on the left as Portugal sought to contain their opponents, no longer able to maintain their pressing. Portugal dropped deeper into defence as the extra time wore on.

Penalties

“I looked for people who were confident. Cesc said he wanted to take one which could be decisive.”

del Bosque

Just as he had done on Sunday 22 June 2008, Cesc Fabregas stepped up and scored the decisive penalty kick which took Spain into the European Championship final.

The Spanish Players surround Cesc and Iker

Conclusions

Despite their exit, Bento must be happy with the performance of the Portuguese team at these finals considering the opposition they faced in their initial group.

That Portugal were able to stick with Spain for so long, only really showing visible signs of tiredness as extra time began is a testament to both the tactical system employed by Bento and the ability of his players to implement it.

For Spain, the performance will not do anything to alleviate the critics of the team but at this stage those critics are highly unlikely to change their viewpoint and arguably fail to understand how and why the team is functioning as it is.

For all the talk of teams knowing how to stop Spain, they have still to meet a team who can achieve that objective.

Spain now stand on the cusp of footballing history.

The System Works

The issue is not the system, but how you use the system

Xabi Alonso.

The Spanish Advance

Spain have progressed through the European Championships without displaying, to many observers at least, their best football. Their play has been characterised by slow, often ponderous passing, but with moments of sublime quality evident. Their rhythmic passing gradually wearing their opponent down, Pass, pass, pass. The ball goes left, it comes back again. The ball goes right, it comes back again. And all the time the opponent is chasing, a state of perpetual motion as they shut off passing corridors which the Spanish are opening up. They follow Iniesta, Silva and Fabregas so Xavi goes backwards and finds Busquets. It’s a seemingly never ending challenge for the opponent. Press the Spanish, retain the shape, prevent options opening up and throughout, ensure that when you do gain possession, you possess an attacking threat. It’s relentless pressure.

Critics have begun labelling Spain as boring even when Andre Iniesta confirms  “Clearly football is more attractive when both teams try to win. Don’t forget this style changed Spanish history”

There is complete faith in the Spanish squad about the manner and style in which they are playing. The full backs push high up the pitch and provide the width as the inverted wingers cut in field and link with the central midfielders and the striker. The striker?

Spain have successfully implemented a false 9 system at this tournament, mirroring many aspects of the Barcelona system. Given the quantity of Barcelona players in the squad, it’s not a huge surprise.

Yet the inclusion of Fabregas as the false 9 in the Spanish line up has created the most controversy from a Spanish perspective to date. His inclusion at the expense of a striker, principally Fernando Torres, has helped fill numerous column inches and been used in conjunction with the boring tag to denigrate Spain. It’s become the stick with which to beat Spain yet it’s not even fully understood by many of those critics why del Bosque is making these changes to the system.

The discussion has focussed on the wrong issues. Journalists seem to be caught in some form of revisionist haze recalling the free flowing attacking Spain of 2008 and 2010. Whilst the team of 2008 was more attacking, Spain’s domination since then delivers increasingly defensive opponents. As opponents have adapted, so too have Spain.

At the heart of the decision to select Fabregas or Torres is not about who provides the better attacking option. The decision revolves around the issue of control and how Spain can gain that control, maintain it and exercise it over their opponent.

Cesc vs Torres – The Issue of Control

Fabregas and Torres – Passes Received vs France

The chart above illustrates where Cesc and Torres received or attempted to receive passes against France in the quarter finals.

Whilst Cesc stays relatively deep in comparison to a conventional striker, Torres is moving towards the penalty area in most cases, operating off the shoulder of the last defender and always waiting for the through ball when he can utilise his pace.

Opponents of the false 9 system will point to this as further evidence of the need for a striker. Torres helped stretch the French defence and pushed them further back whereas Fabregas operated in front of the defence. Even if Torres is not performing well, his presence on the pitch forces defenders into a decision. If they push high, there is always the chance of Torres breaking free therefore, the opponent recognises this and defends deeper.

Whilst that is true, what is also important to note is the additional control which Fabregas offers. The introduction of Torres against France and a more vertical Spain resulted in possession dropping and a loss of control for a period in the match. Playing through balls to suit the natural game of Torres comes at a premium. Not all passes will be successful and the opposition then have the ball back and Spain need to press once more.

With the movement of Fabregas and his combination play, Spain dominate possession and tire the opponent out.

In the games against Italy, Croatia and France, del Bosque has made a change around the 60 minute mark, introducing pace and width to the side initially via Navas and now with Pedro.

Spain control the game, suffocating you with possession and when you are beginning to tire, they introduce an element of verticality to their play.

It’s becoming the del Bosque standard and allows the Spanish players to operate at a lower physical level during the match as they control the tempo. The players have greater recovery periods during the match whilst the opponents chase shadows. Spain rest when in possession. With greater control comes more possession. Spain can recover.. There are signs of tiredness now.

Many of the Spanish squad have played football incessantly now with little in the way of a summer break over the past 4 years.The fatigue is catching up. The false 9 system recognises this and helps address the problem.

Space Creation

We like when other teams leave out their ball players. It’s good for us when others change their system. We never change ours.”

Xavi Hernandez

Too often, teams are altering their system before playing Spain. Clearly, given the talent within the Spanish team, changes must be considered and implemented but a balance must be struck. You cannot change your team so drastically to tackle Spain that you negate your own attacking possibilities.

Against both Croatia and France, opposition substitutions have created space for Spain to attack.  Croatia set out defensively but as they required a win to progress to the quarter final stage, Bilic was forced to make alterations as the game meandered towards a 0-0 stalemate. The final throw of the dice for Bilic was the removal of Vukojevic in the 81st minute. One change which immediately created new openings for Spain. The removal of Vukojevic allowed Fabregas space to move forward unopposed and play the pass which released Iniesta against Croatia. Navas subsequently walked the ball into the net.

Similarly, against France, Blanc was forced to make positive changes to his team as les bleus trailed 1-0. The removal of M’Vila after 79 minutes provided France with a new attacking threat in Giroud but it also created the space for Spain to function more efficiently. Santi Cazorla found time and space to pass forward to Pedro under no pressure. Why was there no pressure? M’Vila had been removed and France lacked any defensive midfield presence.

Teams set out defensive formations against Spain but the loss of a goal alters the paradigm of the match. The opposition coach must react, typically, by removing a defensive payer and replacing him with an attacking player. But so far this has not yielded results and only offered Spain more room to create attacks and ultimately, score goals.

“morir con las botas puestas

Die with your boots on. At least possess the courage to have a go and if you suffer defeat, experience it on your own terms rather than abandoning your footballing principles for a defend at all costs mentality.

Spanish Right vs Portuguese Left

“Ronaldo is one of the world’s best and has incredible qualities but it’s not an individual duel; it’s collective. The key is to control the game. If we have the ball, he’ll participate less and cause us fewer problems.”

It’s an interesting situation. Portugal’s strength is attacking from the left but the achilles heel is the poor defensive performance here. All four goals they have conceded have been via their left.

One of the most interesting features about Portugal is the positioning of Ronaldo on the left wing, That in itself is not unusual nor is the fact that he remains high up the pitch and does not track back.

The question must be why Portugal persist with using a central striker in Helder Postiga (although due to injury, he will be probably be replaced by Hugo Almeida) rather than place Ronaldo in the central striking position.

This would enable the left winger to track back and offer support for Flavio Coentrao. Portugal have conceded four goals in the tournament to date and all of which have originated down their own left side.

As del Bosque trusts his payers, so too does Paulo Bento. Players are played in the position in which they operate at their clubs. Ronaldo is used an inverted left winger with Real Madrid and so performs the same role with Portugal.

Ronaldo will face up against club mate Alvaro Arbeloa. Maligned since the outset of the tournament, Arbeloa offers defensive stability but lacks an attacking threat.

Arbeloa will be supported by a team mate when Ronaldo is about to receive the ball most probably Busquets. Once Ronaldo has possession and has turned towards goal, problems emerge which are infinitely more difficult to solve. Spain will double up on him and deal with him collectively as Pique implies.

Whether his Portuguese team mates can take advantage of the additional space they receive as a consequence of the focus being on Ronaldo, remains to be seen.

The Portugal Challenge

“I think they will sit back and wait. Their midfield is strong and tough. If we’re not right, they can manage the game.”

Andres Iniesta

The question which Paulo Bento must ask is whether he changes tact or does have he have the same level of faith is his players which del Bosque shows in the Spanish?

Portugal are content to cede possession to the opponent and counter attack benefitting from the physical prowess of Ronaldo. With an average of just 46% possession in the games so far, it is unlikely to cause Bento and his charges too much trouble if they see less of the ball.

The midfield trio of Moutinho, Meireles and Veluso combine workrate with flair. Miguel Veluso is normally the deepest of the three but it’s likely that Moutinho will operate slightly deeper than normally. Meireles will look to push forward more often if the opportunity arises.

Nani will need to demonstrate the work ethic he has shown at Man Utd and adequately support Perreira at right back against the surging runs of Alba and the trickery of Iniesta. Alba has settled well into the left back position and from tentative beginnings has developed as the tournament progresses. With Arbeloa likely to hold back, there will be an increasing onus upon Alba to provide real width.

The false 9 system will present a new challenge for Bruno Alves and Pepe at the heart of the defence. Who do they mark? Do they hold if Fabregas drifts deep ir does one stay and one mark?

What of del Bosque and Spain, how will they react? With the same system as before.

The system works.

Spain vs France: Tactical Analysis

Spain win 2-0 and progress to the semi final of the European Championships.

Again, this was a performance characterised by control and tactical discipline throughout although there were one or two moments in the second half when France attempted to gain a foothold in the match. Almost, but not quite.

We have been here before, haven’t we?

Line Ups

Del Bosque once more reverted to the false 9 system which is causing so much controversy with Fabregas replacing Torres.

Spain vs France – Spanish Starting Line Up

Laurent Blanc made four changes following the disappointing defeat to Sweden in the final group game.

Koscielny replaced the suspended Mexes whilst Nasri, Ben Arfa and, most surprisingly, Diarra all dropped to the bench. Cabaye and Malouda were both reintroduced in central midfield. Anthony Reveillere made his first start of the tournament. Something of a lucky omen in previous games for France, Reveillere had yet to taste defeat on the twelve occasions he had started for les bleus.

Spain vs France – French Starting Line Up

The most interesting feature of the French side though, was the deployment of both Reveillere and Debuchy on the right flank. A move clearly designed to prevent Alba and Iniesta pushing down the left side.

French Set Up

We like when other teams leave out their ball players. It’s good for us when others change their system. We never change ours.” Xavi Hernandez

It’s hard to avoid the view that Blanc thought long and hard about his formation, probably too hard. He moved beyond the point of balancing his team’s aspirations and negating the Spanish, and concluded with a line up designed purely to stop Spain.

The inclusion of Debuchy almost as a right wing back with Reveillere behind was designed to combat the attacking thrust of Alba and his combination play with Iniesta. However, on the one occasion when Iniesta released Alba on the left, the resulting cross was converted by Xabi Alonso.

The move also meant France lacked any sort of attacking impetus on their right and allowed Alba to push forward.

The double full back idea has been successfully put into practise at Valencia by Jeremy Mathieu and Jordi Alba, the man who helped undo it tonight, with both players understanding their responsibilities defensively and attacking. Debuchy and Reveillere seemed unsure in the first half. Despite being the right sided midfielder, in theory, Debuchy dropped to deep from the outset, allowing Alba to position himself further up the pitch.

The inclusion of Malouda in midfield was obviously designed as a link between midfield and attack but provided neither. The manner in which Alonso ran from a stationary Malouda for his goal must have alarmed Blanc. There may have been some tactical errors within the team but the players themselves must also share a portion of the blame for something as basic as failure to track a runner.

Spanish Mobility

With the use of the false 9 system, the requirement for midfielders to make forward runs is paramount. Spain have failed to do that so far with the exception of Fabregas.

Tonight, the Spanish midfield all demonstrated their ability to move forward.

The French midfield will be sorely criticised for their performance especially Malouda but it’s probably the first time in the tournament when the Spanish midfield have all offered higher levels of movement epitomised not only by Alonso scoring the opening goal but also by Busquets pushing forward and being the most advanced played at one point in the first half. The trend continued into the second half when Xavi operated almost as a second striker at times, tucked in behind Torres.

Xabi Alonso provided his best performance of the tournament so far showcasing his passing range and operating in a slightly more advanced position:-

Alonso – Passes vs France

But does the mobility, and the improved performance of Alonso, come with a downside?

This was arguably Xavi’s weakest performance of the tournament. With Alonso more influential and Xavi moving further forward, we see the problems that were envisaged pre-tournament.

Xavi Passes vs France

Xavi made fewer passes tonight and when he was positioned slightly further forward, the incisiveness of the pass begins to fade slightly with more horizontal passing becoming prominent. Alonso and Xavi need to operate in different areas of the pitch to both be effective. If Alonso steps forward, Xavi is squeezed.

The Barcelona lynchpin remains unnervingly accurate with his passing through.

French Left vs Spanish Right

This had the potential to be a key battleground in the game yet it never quite materialised.

The French are very strong on their left side with Ribery stationed there and joined by the drifting Benzema.

Against the weak link in the Spanish defence, Arbeloa, there was the possibility of success in this flank particularly as attacks would draw Pique out from his central comfort zone. Despite some forays, the attack seldom amounted to any real orchestrated period of pressure.

In the defensive phase of the game, Ribery seldom bothered tracking back and remained high up the pitch, letting Arbeloa push forward.

Missed Opportunity?

Once again, Alvaro Arbeloa had acres of space to himself on the Spanish right with France preoccupied with Alba on the left and Ribery uninterested in backtracking.

Whereas Alba is involved in combination play with the midfield, primarily Iniesta, Arbeloa is often left isolated on the right and typically only becomes involved in the play via crossfield passes. The ball tends to be played to him as opposed to ahead of him meaning he can be closed down quickly. Arbeloa is therefore forced to turn inside or pass backwards.

Opponents are not considering Arbeloa to be a threat. Against Ireland, Croatia and now France he has been left in space.

Spain need to better utilise the space which opponents are presenting Arbeloa with.

Second Half

From an entertainment point of view, the second half was probably the dullest 45 minutes of the tournament to date.

France tried to increase the tempo of their play but struggled to find any sort of rhythm in their play, failing to register a shot on target during the second half. Spain, showing signs of tiredness, appeared content to play within themselves but just above the level of the French.

A number of substitutions in the second half offered potential to change the game yet had little effect.

The introduction of Menez and Nasri for Debuchy and Malouda offered more attacking options for the French. Del Bosque responded immediately with two substitutions, Pedro and Torres replacing Silva and Fabregas. The move provided Spain with more of a direct threat and seemed sensible with the increased likelihood of the game being stretched as les bleus pushed forward in search of the equaliser.

Pedro, rather than move to the right was positioned on the left perhaps to support Alba against the new threat from Menez and the attack minded Reveillere.

The substitutions failed to have any real effect for either side although Spain began losing an element of control. Their possession dropping from 63% in the 60th minute down to 56% in the 80th minute. Indeed, between the 60th minute and 75th minute, France had 55% possession yet throughout this period, Spain always looked secure.

The removal of M’Vila was Blanc’s last gamble in the 78th minute and it failed when Cazorla, a replacement for the tiring Iniesta, found space in front of the French defence, in the space which M’Vila had previously occupied, to thread the ball through to Pedro who was subsequently fouled for the penalty.

Cesc vs Torres – The Issue of Control

Fabregas and Torres – Passes Received vs France

The chart above illustrates where Cesc and Torres receive or attempt to receive passes.

Whilst Cesc stays relatively deep in comparison to a conventional striker, Torres is moving towards the penalty area in most cases, operating off the shoulder of the last defender and always waiting for the through ball when he can utilise his pace.

Opponents of the false 9 system will point to this as further evidence of the need for a striker. Torres helps stretch the French defence and pushed them further back whereas Fabregas operates in front of the defence. Even if Torres is not performing well, his presence on the pitch forces defenders into a decision. If they push high, there is always the chance of Torres breaking free therefore, the opponent recognises this and defends deeper.

Whilst that is true, what is also important to note is the additional control which Fabregas offers. The introduction of Torres and a more vertical Spain resulted in possession dropping and a loss of control for a period in the match. Playing through balls to suit the natural game of Torres comes at a premium. Not all passes will be successful and the opposition then have the ball back and Spain need to press once more.

With the movement of Fabregas and his combination play, Spain dominate possession and tire the opponent out.

In the games against Italy, Croatia and France, del Bosque has made a change around the 60 minute mark, introducing pace and width to the side initially via Navas and now with Pedro.

Spain control the game, suffocating you with possession and when you are beginning to tire, they introduce an element of verticality to their play.

It’s becoming the del Bosque standard and allows the Spanish players to operate at a lower physical level during the match as they control the tempo. The players have greater recovery periods during the match whilst the opponents chase shadows. The Spanish players need this recovery time too. There are signs of tiredness now.

Space Creation

Against both Croatia and France, opposition substitutions have created space for Spain to attack. The removal of Vukojevic in the 81st minute allowed Fabregas space to move forward unopposed and play the pass which released Iniesta against Croatia. Against France, the removal of M’Vila after 79 minutes provided Cazorla with time and space to pass forward to Pedro under no pressure.

Teams set out defensive formations against Spain but the loss of a goal alters the paradigm of the match. The opposition coach must react, typically, by removing a defensive payer and replacing him with an attacking player. But so far this has not yielded results and only offered Spain more room to create attacks and ultimately, score goals.

Conclusions

There were some issues for concern for Spain tonight but perhaps not what many people expected. Spain showed glimpses of fatigue.

“I am thinking about this problem,”  admitted del Bosque

With two days less rest before they meet Portugal in the semi finals, don’t expect Spain to showcase expansive attacking football in the remainder of the competition. Although capable of it, this tournament now becomes solely about the result and the opportunity to make history.

Will this result now end the discussion around the Spanish set up? Probably not even though the players themselves appear convinced as Alonso states:-

The issue is not the system, but how you use the system

Spain will not change. They will continue to play the same way they have done over these past four years with an inherent belief that what they are doing is correct. It’s proven a highly successful tactic thus far.

The question which Paulo Bento must ask is whether he changes tact or does have he have the same level of faith is his players which del Bosque shows in the Spanish?

Spain vs Croatia: Tactical Analysis

The final group game for both sides brought the usual list of permutations which could ensure qualification for either side.

Amidst all the talk around the multiple outcomes and Italian cries of fair play, without any hint of irony, for Spain and Croatia to avoid a 2-2 which would see Italy eliminated irrespective of their result, a game of football threatened to break out. Almost, but not quite.

Spain won with a late goal from Jesus Navas and, combined with Italy’s 2-0 win over Ireland, this sent Croatia home from Euro 2012.

This was a drab, scrappy game with Spain poor. It became increasingly nervy for supporters of a Spanish persuasion as the game wore on. Del Bosque confirmed the lack of quality on display :-

“The truth is it was not a great game overall and this should concern us. Things didn’t go according to plan.”

Line Ups

Del Bosque retained faith with the same players who had beaten Ireland with ease in the previous group game.

Spain vs Croatia – Spanish Starting Line Up

Jelavic and Perisic dropped to the bench for Croatia to be replaced by Pranjic on the left of midfield and Vida at right back.

Although appearing as something akin to a 4-2-3-1 on paper, Croatia switched to a 5-3-2 in the defensive phase with Srna dropping deep to cover for the forward runs of Alba. Vida subsequently tucked in as something of a makeshift centre back.

Modric took up an advanced role just behind Mandzukic and sought to run into the channels, primarily to the left, either side of the central striker.

Spain vs Croatia – Croatian Starting Line Up

The Italian Job – Part 2?

From the outset, it was clear that, although Croatia were not following the same game plan as Prandelli had utilised with Italy, there were many broad similarities.

Croatia fell into a back five when defending with Srna acting as more of a conventional right wing back than Strinic, who was more conservative, on the left.

The midfield three stayed close to the defence and narrow to prevent Spain from passing their way through the midfield. Pranjic tucked in on the left which left Arebloa free but he was never able to take advantage of this space.

In the attacking department, Modric and Mandzukic, to a lesser extent, both sought to run into the channels and find the space vacated by the Spanish full backs who occupied very high starting positions.

Allied to this was the deliberate ploy of breaking the game up with fouls ranging from niggly to the downright cynical during the first half  (Srna being the prime suspect here) which prevented Spain from developing any rhythm.

Pass, pass, pass etc

Spain continued their trend at Euro 2012 of dominating possession but playing with little intensity during the opening half of the game.

Alba and Arbeloa took up very high positions from the outset but Arebloa was seldom utilised on the right despite his space whilst Alba was closely watched by Srna.

In the centre Alonso dropped between Pique and Ramos when Spain took possession, helping switch play on occasion but the passing was far too slow and ponderous.

Silva frequently left his right wing berth and adopted a very central position further narrowing the game.

As ever, the central area of the pitch was congested and the passing speed deteriorated as the half progressed.

The one player who sought to eschew the incessant passing was Iniesta who, as demonstrated against Italy, would make darting forward runs towards the Croatian defence.

Overall, Spain had 64% possession but they need to produce a final product to ensure overall control of the game.

Croatian Set Pieces

On the few occasions that Croatia won a set piece in the Spanish half, a number of players moved forward in anticipation of an aerial delivery into the penalty area. Spain are weak aerially and often appear chaotic when defending se pieces. Yet, this can often be an ideal opportunity for Spain to break down a defensive opponent.

The transition offers Spain a number of possibilities if they can move forward at pace whilst the opponent is still moving back into position.

These opportunities though are seldom grasped by the Spanish either through a lack of pace or through seeking an additional touch or pass when a more direct movement is required. The lack of directness is apparent in other elements of the Spanish play.

David Silva is often the guilty party. In the 40th minute he was over indulgent in the penalty area, shifting the ball from side to side before his shot was blocked. In the 62nd minute, Spain had a quick counter attack but Silva took an additional touch on the halfway line instead of releasing the forward pass and was tackled, losing possession.

Substitutions

Del Bosque made the first Spanish change with Torres exiting to be replaced by Navas in the 59th minute. Although this provided Spain with more width and variation in their game, the removal of Torres was arguably wrong.

When Spain had opportunities they were arriving on the transition. Silva lacks genuine pace and always prefers to take an additional touch as discussed above.

In addition to this, removing Torres meant Spain lacked a central reference point. If Navas beat his opponent and reached the goal line, who would he cross to?

The substitution was a conservative move and demonstrated del Bosque’s belief in keeping control of the game.

The heat map below demonstrates the worth of Navas in stretching the game and providing width and pace in the Spanish attack. Navas will attack the goal line and look for cut backs. It forces defenders to turn and move back towards their goal whereas normally the Spanish play in front of you.

Even if Navas can be frustrating on occasion and his final ball can lack quality, he brings something else to the game which no other Spanish player offers.

Spain vs Croatia – Spain with and without Jesus Navas

This contrasts sharply with the Croatian substitutions although Bilic had to seek a winning goal, a draw was no use to Croatia at this point. Had this been the first or second group game, Bilic would most likely have continued with the same game plan. Here, he had to seek a solution.

Croatia moved from their 5-3-2 formation to a more positive 4-4-2 with the removal of Vida and Pranjic with Jelavic and Perisic coming on.

With hindsight, perhaps Bilic should have made the move earlier in the second half rather than waiting.

Del Bosque’s second substitution was the straight swap of Fabregas for Silva which must leave Fernando Llorente and Alvaro Negredo wondering why they are in the squad.

Another conservative move and one which seeks the control of the midfield area at all costs.

Jesus Navas Goal

Supporters of del Bosque will claim the goal exonerates his decisions and to a degree there is truth in that. However, the goal arose because Fabregas had space to move into with Croatia abandoning their more circumspect formation as they chased the game. With neither Vukojevic now off the pitch and Rakitic also pushing forward, the Spanish could run at the Croatian defence.

The goal itself was superbly crafted and executed with a deftly lobbed ball through to Iniesta who square for Navas to walk the ball into the net.

Conclusions

Spain are through and publicly, the squad and staff are likely to confirm that the first goal of the tournament has been achieved but privately there must be reservations over the manner of their play at times.

The ball was recycled far too slowly and the lack of width has still not been fully resolved.

Del Bosque will be criticised for the performance in the Spanish press. Bilic set his team out well and can take credit despite the defeat.

Spain won by remaining true to their beliefs in tiki taka but the margin for error tonight was virtually non-existent. They could easily have drawn or even lost the game.

The easy games for Spain, as such, are over. More demanding and tougher challenges await when there will be no margin for error.

Spain vs Italy: Tactical Analysis

Spain still await a competitive win over Italy after seven attempts following this 1-1 draw.

A game that lived up to expectations, the first real heavyweight clash of the 2012 European Championships certainly had plenty of talking points. Much of the pre-match discussion around the lack of width in the Spanish game and the propensity to overplay in front of their opponents were evident here. Combined with del Bosque again showing he will make changes and alter the style of play when required, if a little belatedly in this example.

Shape

Both teams adopted formations which are unlikely to be replicated by anyone else at the tournament. Moving away from the ubiquitous 4-2-3-1, Spain were their normal 4-3-3 with a false 9 in operation whereas Italy set up with a 3-5-2.

The only change from the predicted Spanish starting eleven as shown here was the inclusion of Fabregas operating, jointly, with David Silva in the false 9 role.

Spain vs Italy – Spanish Starting Line Up

Prandelli, meanwhile, a 3-5-2 despite injury meaning he was without Barzagli. Daniele De Rossi dropping between Chiellini and Bonucci to form the three man defence. Giaccherini was brought in at left wing back to make his Italian debut. Otherwise, the Italian line up was as expected.

Spain vs Italy – Italian Starting Line Up

This was a more attack orientated 3-5-2 rather than a system that becomes defensive and lapses into 5-3-2

Pressing

Italy pressed in a coordinated fashion from the outset, attempting to stop Spain building attacks from the defence. In particular, Cassano and Balotelli worked extremely hard to close down Ramos and Pique.

By contrast, Spain were disjointed here and seldom pressed in a coherent fashion. Sometimes one player would press whilst at other times, they would stand off. This provided De Rossi with ample time in possession to pick out team mates and begin the process of constructing attacks.

Spanish Full Backs vs Italian Wing Backs

A key battle on the flanks and one which the Italian wing backs gained the upper hand early in the game.

In theory, the wing backs should have been pushed back due to a combination of the Spanish full backs and wide attackers. However, with both Iniesta and Silva drifting inward, this allowed Maggio and Giaccherini to retain relatively high starting positions when the opportunity arose and move onto their direct opponents.

As a consequence, both Alba and the more conservative Arbeloa adopted less advanced positions and the Italian wing backs could make forward progress positionally as well as offering an outlet for their team mates.

With Alba and Arbeloa further back, Spain, rather predictably, became to central and struggled to make any headway at times against a well disciplined opponent. Much of their creativity arrived via Iniesta who was prepared to run and commit defenders and managed to carve out several good chances without any success.

Italian Chances

Combining the two issues above neatly summarises how Italy managed to create some excellent scoring chances during the first half and via Balotelli early in the second half.

Cassano and Balotelli both received the ball early and sought to make runs into the channels where space can exist between the Spanish central defender and his respective full back. Pique is uncomfortable when pulled wide although it was Ramos who was pressed and lost possession allowing Balotelli a clear run on goal which he squandered by dwindling on the ball.

Fabregas and Silva

It was widely expected that Silva would start this game as the false 9 with the assumption that Pedro or possibly Jesus Navas would start on the right of the attack. The inclusion of Fabregas, although not dismissed, was a little surprising. Whilst they created and scored the goal, they also made contributions to the problems Spain encountered.

Fabregas has given some of his best performances at club level for Barcelona this season when exploiting the space which Messi has vacated by dropping deep. This was clearly shown with the goal when Silva dropped slightly deeper and provided the through ball for the forward running Fabregas.

As the most vertical of the Spanish midfielders, this role is ideally suited for Fabregas. However, when Fabregas operated as the false 9, you lose this directness with Silva lacking this necessary quality in his play. Less inclined to make the forward run and more likely to take an extra touch on the ball, Silva provides more craft and guile when a more penetrative element is required.

Further, when Fabregas made the runs forward, he tended to do so from a very central position which offered Giaccherini ample space on the left.

Second Half Changes

Spain increased the tempo noticeably from the outset of the second half and, combined with the Italian’s tiring as the game wore on, began to build more attacks but still without a real cutting edge. Too often the play was focussed in front of the Italian back line with forward movement lacking from all areas of the pitch. When it did occur, Spain created opportunities.

This situation changed with the arrival of Jesus Navas, the one traditional winger within the Spanish squad. Holding a position on the right touch-line, Giaccherini was forced back and with Navas showing glimpses of his pace and skill, Chiellini was pulled closer towards his team mate to offer cover. The Italian back line began to be stretched.

The arrival of Torres, despite his misses, also gave Spain a more direct threat. Torres requires space to operate effectively and with Italy holding a relatively high line but now being stretched wider by Spain, there were opportunities for him to use his pace.

Overall

Cesare Prandelli, despite his post match comments that Italy “need to improve”, must be happy with both the performance and the result. They stifled Spain until relatively late in the game when the effects of their pressing became more apparent as they tired.

The deployment of the 3-5-2 system worked very well and clearly gave Italy the tactical edge over Spain. It would have been interesting had del Bosque made a change at the start of the second half, bringing on Jesus Navas at that point and pushing Italy back.

Nonetheless, that Italy were prepared to be aggressive against Spain, pressing high and adopting a more direct style of play, targeting the strikers with early passes vindicated Prandelli’s selection.

For Spain, many of the issues which were highlighted in the tournament preview remain in position. For the Ireland and Croatia games, del Bosque is likely to make some slight tweaks. He is an evolutionist, not a revolutionist. Expect Silva or Fabregas to be replaced with Navas or Pedro to open the pitch up.

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